Marquette Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 4 June 1935

Article 3

Torts: Responsibility for Injuries Resulting from
Fear
Adam E. Wolf

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Adam E. Wolf, Torts: Responsibility for Injuries Resulting from Fear, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 247 (1935).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol19/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

NOTES
TORTS-REsPONSIBILITY

FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM FEAR-It

is customary to list the elements of every tort as, the existence of a
legal duty, a breach of that duty, and damages as the proximate result
of that breach.- Where no right has been violated, it is said, there is no
injury for which the law affords compensation. 2 An act may seem to
violate some- moral standard and still be "legal." Injuries resulting
therefrom are damnum absque injuria.3 To expound the "law" in these
words serves rather to obscure the problems which the courts must
solve than to give any true picture of the judicial process as it operates
within the field of tort.
Legal rights are numerous. All of them are personal in some sense.
All persons, as residents of the community, enjoy some degree of protection for their interests in their own personal integrity, their reputations, the relationships between themselves and other classes of persons,
between themselves and physical things, chattels and land. Through the
judicial process this protection is made concrete in the form of a judgment against some tortfeasor. The protection afforded to individuals
through the judicial process for their varied interests is not unlimited.
As the New York Court of Appeals has said about the right to protection for one's interest in his own physical integrity, " * * * bodily security is protected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but
only against some. One who seeks redress at law does not make out a
cause .of action by showing only that there has been damage done to
his person. If the harm is not willful, he must show that the act as to
him had possibilities of danger so many and so apparent as to entitle
him to be protected against the doing of it, though the harm was unintended." 4
It is assumed without protest that every person has a right to get
protection for his interest in his own bodily security. What factual
situation must exist to insure protection for that right against the invasion complained of in the particular case? The answer to that question admittedly involves the application of the doctrine of proximate
cause. 5 That problem, the fixing of the limits of responsibility in a
typical kind of case, is a function of the court. It is question of law
and not a question of fact, to use the popular phrase. The court is
affected by the idea of precedent, of course, but the court is free to fix
the bounds of responsibility, when the legislature has not literally
spoken, as its own ideas of "public policy" dictate.
The present discussion covers the "application" of the "doctrine"
of proximate cause in fright cases. An attempt will be made to analyze
the cases to show how the courts, in considering the matter of protection for a person's interest in his own bodily security, have been con1 City of Mobile v. McClure, 221 Ala. 51, 127 So. 832 (1930).
2McCoy v. Board of Directors of Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 95 Ark. 345, 129

S.W. 1097, 29 L.R.A. (N.s.) 396 (1910).
Gebhardtv. Holmes, 149 Wis. 428, 135 N.W. 860 (1912).
4 Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253
3

(1928).

5 For a brief review of the history of proximate cause in Wisconsin see Note
(1934) 18 MARQ. L. REv. 123.
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cerned with determining, first, whether "fear," as a condition of mind,
is the kind of injury which will raise the question of protection at all,
and secondly, whether the bodily condition produced by "fear" in the
special case is an injury for which the particular defendant can be held
responsible.
Fear, the mental condition, is difficult to evaluate. Where the conduct of the defendant has been inadvertent and not intentional, and
where the plaintiff has been frightened as a consequence, the courts
hold that there can be no responsibility. It is not the kind of injury
against which the plaintiff ought to have protection.7 The courts are not
particularly concerned about the suffering of a plaintiff who has experienced merely an unpleasant sensation. Not only is fear, the mental condition, difficult to evaluate, but its symptoms are difficult to detect. If
no limitation is placed upon the scope of the defendant's responsibility
any number of persons may pretend to have been frightened by reason
of the defendant's conduct.
If the difficulty of evaluation were the only obstacle a plaintiff had
to overcome in these cases it would seem plausible that he should recover substantial compensation from a particular defendant where his
physical condition is ailing and where the condition has followed definitely as a result of nervous shock produced by the defendant's conduct. In instances of this sort, courts frequently talk as if the plaintiff
ought not recover because to recognize such claims would tend to encourage baseless lawsuits and to tax the capacity of juries.8 These dispositions disclose, consciously or unconsciously, that the courts seem to
do what seems best to satisfy the tests of administrative convenience. 9
6

Recovery for fright or fear in the absence of any physical impact and any
subsequent injury as a result thereof, has been denied for the reason that the
injuries suffered, where the only manifestation was fright, were too subtle and
speculative to be capable of measurement by any standard known to the law.
Lehman v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 Hun (N.Y.) 355 (1888) ; Ewing v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340, 14 L.R.A. 666, 30 Am. St. Rep. 708
(1892); Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 34 L.R.A.
781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604 (1896) ; Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 168 Mass.
285, 47 N.E. 88, 38 L.R.A. 512, 60 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1897).
7
This seems, however, to be inconsistent with those cases where a plaintiff is
suing for damages for personal injuries and where the courts permit the jury
in building up the amount of a verdict to put in a sum for mental suffering.
See Morley v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183 (1869); Ulrich v. Schwartz, 199 Wis. 24,
255 N.W. 195 (1929).
8 Victoria Railways Co'minissioners v. Coultas, L.R. 13 A.C. 222 (1888) ; Ewing
v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340, 14 L.R.A. 666, 30 Am. St.
Rep. 709 (1892); Ward v. West Jersey, etc., R. Co., 65 N. 3. L. 383, 47 Atl.
561 (1900) ; Houston v. Freemanburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905). The
decisions are obviously based upon convenience. The court in Alabama Fuel
& Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205, 207 (1916), sounds a note
of caution: "The doctrine of expediency or public policy should be very
sparingly and cautiously employed, for if a person's rights have been unlawfully invaded, it would ill become a court of justice to withhold its remedy
on the ground of expediency." For a good discussion of the use of public
policy in cases of this type see Note (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 260.
9
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 38 L.R.A.
512, 60 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1897), is a typical case in which recovery is denied
for injury resulting through fright caused by negligent conduct'without physical impact. The court is very clear as to the basis of the decision: "It would
seem therefore that the real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere
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When the courts suggest that there can be "recovery for fright"
when there has been some bodily impact' 0 they are willing to overlook
some of ihe practical difficulties about evaluation, and such, in a group
of cases which is necessarily but a small sampling of all the "fright"
cases. The danger of manufactured actions is not too great when there
has been some "impact" because fear or fright will be merely an additional element in the case.
There are some instances, including some Wisconsin cases, where
the plaintiff, whose ailing bodily condition has resulted from fear or
fright caused by the defendant's conduct, has recovered substantial
compensation although there was no "bodily impact."" The defendant's
conduct in the particular case had subjected the plaintiff's physical self
to peril. The probability that numerous persons might claim to have
been frightened by reason of the defendant's conduct is limited by
reason of the fact that the safety of a few persons only could have been
endangered, and by reason of another fact, too, that comparatively
few, if any, persons have suffered any physical disability from any
fright produced by the defendant's act.
Recently there has been before the Wisconsin court 2 a case concerning the matter of responsibility where the person affected by the
defendant's conduct was not personally in peril himself, but suffered
the physical disability from nervous shock when he saw a third person's
fright must be something different; and it probably rests upon the ground
that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other rule."
In a similar case, the New York Court of Appeals denied recovery saying,
"If the right of recovery in this class of cases should once be established, it
would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection." Mitchell v. Rochester R.
Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 34 L.R.A. 781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604 (1896).
Holmes, C. J., in Homans v. Boston El. R. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N.E.
737, 57 L.R.A. 291, 91 Am. St. Rep. 324 (1902), in approving the denial of
recovery in this class of cases said, "It is an arbitrary exception based upon
a notion of what is practical." The objection of the possibility of fraud as
a reason for denying recovery has been characterized as a "pitiful confession
of incompetence on the part of courts of justice." Parkhurst, J., in Simons v.
Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907). The weight of objection is
questionable when one considers that the function of a jury in every case is
to sift the evidence and to determine whether an injury has been proved.
10 As to what has been held to constitute sufficient impact see Goldman v. Detroit
United Rys, 200 Mich. 543, 166 N.W. 1007 (1918) ; Comstock v. Wilson, 257
N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) ; Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass.
456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) ; Israel v. Ulrich, 114 Conn. 599, 159 Atl. 634 (1932).
"Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918) ; Watson v. Dilts, 116
Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068, 57 L.R.A. 559, 93 Am. St. Rep. 239 (1902) ; Purcell
v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134. 50 N.W. 1034, 16 L.R.A. 203 (1892);
Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625, 24 L.R.A. (x.s.) 1159 (1909);
Sundquist v. Madison R. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
12 Waube v. Warrington, (Wis. 1935) 258 N.W. 497 (1935) is a recent case involving precisely this situation. There the deceased was looking out the window of her house watching her child cross the highway and witnessed the
negligent killing of the child by the defendant. The deceased, who was in a
frail state of health, became extremely hysterical, sick and prostrated through
the fright and shock and died as a direct result. The sole question upon demurrer was whether the facts thus alleged in the complaint stated a cause of
action in favor of the administrator of the deceased. The court denied recovery on the ground that the defendant owed no duty, under the circumstances,
to the deceased, basing its determination upon the ground of public policy.
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safety put in peril by reason of the defendant's act. The Wisconsin
court, like most courts, whether or not they have pretended to follow
the "physical impact rule," refused to permit recovery in this situation.
More specifically stated, recovery was denied in one case to a plaintiff
who had sustained nervous shock and permanent impairment of health
when she saw her daughter dragged along a railway platform, 13 in another case when the plaintiff's fear and physical condition was caused
by her concern over the safety of her mother whose life was imperilled
by reason of an explosion set off by the defendant, 4 in other cases
where the plaintiff's fear was caused by reason of her concern for her
husband's safety who was being assaulted by the defendant,15 and
where the plaintiff became ill at seeing a person killed by reason of the
defendant's negligence.' 6 In each case the court came to the conclusion
that the particular defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff." These
courts seem not to have been concerned about the place of the accident
or the relationship between the person in danger and the person frightened so long as the frightened person was himself in no personal
danger. There are other courts which have come to different conclusions, particularly when the third person whose life was endangered
bore some close relationship to the ailing and frightened plaintiff, when
the place where the defendant performed his act was a private place,
like a home, or when the conduct of the defendant was particularly
reprehensible.'
Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900). And
see also Southern R. Co. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916), holding the
defendant not liable for injury to plaintiff caused by fright at seeing her child
4 mangled.
' Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N.W. 134 (1899).
15 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152 S.W. 976, 45 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 433, (1913); McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742, Ann. Cas.
1913E, 500 (1912) ; Buckman v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 373, 79
N.W. 98 (1899). Contra: Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244
(1924).
36 Snith v. Johnson & Co., an unreported case referred to in Dulieu v. White,
[1901] 2 K.B. 669, 675.
1' This ground for denial is clearly stated in Waube v. Warrington, (Wis. 1935)
258 N.W. 497, 500 (1935), where the court says, "It is one thing to say that as
to those who are put in peril of physical impact, impact is immaterial if physical injury is caused by shock arising from peril. * * * It is quite another thing
to say that those who are out of the field of physical danger through impact
shall have a legally protected right to be free from emotional distress occasioned by the peril of others when that distress results in physical impairment.
The answer to this question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is it clear
that it can be entirely disposed of by a consideration of what the defendant
ought reasonably to have anticipated as a consequence of his wrong. The
answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order
to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and
expediently be extended." The court then goes on to show why it decided that the
defendant did not owe the deceased a duty, giving as its reasons, first, that
the consequences are too unusual and extraordinary and would be an unreasonable burden upon the users of the highways, and, second, that a contrary
determination would open the way to fraudulent claims and would enter a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Is See Watson v. Dill, 116 Iowa 249, • 89 N.W. 1068 (1902), a case
where the defendant was a trespasser in the home of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
was in fear of the safety of her child, her husband, and herself. Recovery was
allowed on the ground that the plaintiff had a right to the peaceful and quiet
'3
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It is difficult to suggest any standards which the courts should adhere to in disposing of these cases. Nor can the problems of policy
concerned be solved by suggesting that there are two rules, one permitting "recovery for fright" and the other denying that there can be
such recovery, and suggesting, too, that each court must line up under
one rule or the other. There are any number of different situations in
which "fright" may appear, and these different situations require different adjustments. There can be no strict rule nor any liberal rule. No
person brought into a case as a defendant ought to be, nor is he, responsible for every consequence which can or does follow as a result
of his conduct. Factors such as convenience from the point of view of
those concerned about the judicial process, punishment for those persons whose conduct has been selfish, and concern for the person who
has been affected by this conduct, are matters which the judges consciously or unconsciously carry in their thoughts when disposing of
these or any other tort cases. The bar may not like a particular disposition in a particular kind of case, but temporarily, at least, the bar must
accept it for what it is, a choice of policy.
ADAM E. WOLF

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-OccuRRENCE
CUPATIONAL DISEASE.-The increased influx

OF DISABILITY IN OC-

of cases in which the
claimant alleges disability due to occupational disease, and particularly
to that disease known as silicosis', merits a serious consideration of the
enjoyment of her home and an unlawful entry was an invasion of such right.
In Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916), recovery was allowed
for injuries resulting from fright alone where the fright was caused by the
wanton and willful acts of the defendant, though such acts were directed
against the plaintiff's husband, and not against the plaintiff personally. Such
conduct upon the part of the defendant took place in the home of the plaintiff. In Alabama v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916), the defendant
shot a dog in the close proximity of the plaintiff's daughter. The plaintiff sustained a fright and physical consequences followed, for which she was allowed
to recover. Nowhere throughout the opinion is there an indication that the
plaintiff was frightened other than because of her own personal peril. In Engle
v. Sinmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906), defendant's employees entered the
home of the plaintiff and rummaged around, without her permission and in
her presence. The plaintiff was frightened and sustained physical injuries
therefrom. Recovery was allowed upon the theory that the right invaded was
that of the peaceful possession of the premises. See also Hill v. Kimball, 76
Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59, 7 L.R.A. 619 (1890). In the case of Ham brook v. Stokes
Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141, a case strictly analogous to Waube v. W~arrington, (Wis. 1935) 258 N.W. 497 (1935), a servant of the defendant negligently permitted a truck to coast down a hill. Mrs. Hambrook saw the truck
coming around a curve, shortly after she had left her children at a point
above the curve. She was not in any personal physical peril. She became fearful for the safety of her children, and upon inquiry was informed that a little
girl had been injured. She went to the hospital and found that her daughter
had been injured. She sustained a severe shock and consequent physical injury
from which she died. The court assuming the existence of a duty, proceeded
to view the case from the standpoint of proximate cause and permitted a
recovery.
69. The report defines silicosis as
1 Biennial Rep. Wis. Ind. Comm. (1932-34),
"a disease of the respiratory tract caused by inhalation of deleterious dust
in certain industries."

